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T
he defense of qualified immunity protects government
officials performing discretionary functions from liabili-
ty, trial, and other burdens of civil litigation (such as dis-
covery), as long as their conduct does not violate “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”1 This defense, which ultimately derives from the com-
mon law immunity enjoyed by judicial officers2, plays a significant
role in lawsuits alleging constitutional or civil rights violations by offi-
cials of local governments.3 In situations where officials are forced to
make quick decisions under volatile circumstances — for example,
when a police officer must use force to effect an arrest — the defense
is particularly necessary to balance the rights of individuals legiti-
mately falling victim to abuse of power against the costs that insub-
stantial litigation imposes on society.4
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By Michael B. Kent Jr.
Qualified Immunity in
the Eleventh Circuit
After Hope v. Pelzer
“government
officials perform-
ing discretionary
functions general-
ly are shielded
from liability for
civil damages
insofar as their
conduct does not
violate clearly
established statu-
tory or constitu-
tional rights of
which a reason-
able person
would have
known.”
Since 1982, when the Supreme
Court established the contempo-
rary formula for granting qualified
immunity, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has frequently
been called upon to define the con-
tours of the defense as it applies to
government officials in Georgia,
Florida and Alabama. Over the
course of time, the Eleventh
Circuit’s decisions gave a distinct
shape to the doctrine of qualified
immunity and rendered the
defense the decisive issue in most
cases alleging civil rights violations
by government officials. As the
court explained as recently as 2001:
“A government-officer defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity
unless, at the time of the incident,
the ‘preexisting law dictates, that is,
truly compel[s],’ the conclusion for
all reasonable, similarly situated
public officials that what
Defendant was doing violated
Plaintiffs’ federal rights in the cir-
cumstances.”5 Although circum-
stances clearly existed under which
qualified immunity would be
denied, government officials could
find comfort that, in most cases,
their entitlement to qualified
immunity would be upheld.
In July 2002, however, the
Supreme Court issued a decision
that threatened the stability of the
Eleventh Circuit’s qualified immu-
nity jurisprudence and raised sever-
al questions about the doctrine’s
applicability in the states that com-
prise the Eleventh Circuit. In Hope v.
Pelzer6 — a case where a panel of
the Eleventh Circuit had affirmed
the district court’s grant of qualified
immunity — the Supreme Court
held that the defense was not appli-
cable and accused the Eleventh
Circuit of imposing a “rigid gloss
on the qualified immunity stan-
dard.”7 The decision in Hope poten-
tially dealt a harsh blow to twenty
years’ worth of case law, as well as
to the rules under which qualified
immunity in the Eleventh Circuit
was analyzed. Since Hope, however,
the Eleventh Circuit has indicated
that those rules, and the defense of
qualified immunity, are very much
alive and well despite premature
reports to the contrary.
This article explains the law of
qualified immunity in the Eleventh
Circuit prior to the Hope decision
and examines how the fundamental
characteristics of that law were
called into question by Hope. This
article also examines the Eleventh
Circuit’s post-Hope decisions,
demonstrating that the substance of
qualified immunity in the Eleventh
Circuit essentially remains the
same.
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY IN THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
PRIOR TO HOPE
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the
Supreme Court laid down the gen-
eral rule that “government officials
performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.”8
Abandoning prior precedent that
largely analyzed qualified immuni-
October 2003 23
ty by looking to the subjective intent
of the official, the Court announced
that, from that point forward, the
entitlement to qualified immunity
would depend primarily on objec-
tive factors.9 The Court explained
that its new test struck the proper
balance between the competing
interests underlying most civil
rights litigation. Where an individ-
ual’s rights are clearly established,
the official can be expected to know
whether his conduct violates those
rights, and he should be subject to
liability. On the other hand, where
an individual’s rights are not clearly
established, the public interest is
better served by allowing the offi-
cial to perform his duties “with
independence and without fear of
consequences.”10
At first, the Eleventh Circuit
seemed slow to adopt the new
Harlow formula for qualified immu-
nity11, but the court clearly had
become a believer by 1994 when it
issued its en banc decision in
Lassiter v. Alabama A&M
University.12 Latching on to
Harlow’s rationale that an official
can be charged with knowing
whether his conduct violates a
“clearly established” right, the
court undertook to define what
“clearly established” meant in the
objective context of qualified
immunity. Noting that “govern-
ment agents are not always
required to err on the side of cau-
tion,” the court explained that
rights generally are clearly estab-
lished only when they previously
have been developed in “such a
concrete and factually defined con-
text to make it obvious to all rea-
sonable government actors, in the
[official’s] place, that ‘what he is
doing’ violates federal law.”13
What this means in real life, accord-
ing to the Lassiter court, is that a
civil rights plaintiff cannot defeat
the qualified immunity defense by
pointing to general propositions
and abstractions, such as a require-
ment that the official act reason-
ably.14 Rather, to defeat qualified
immunity, the rights at issue must
have been defined by prior cases,
the facts of which, although not
required to be identical, must be
“materially similar” to the facts of
the case being decided.15 Put differ-
ently, “[f]or qualified immunity to
be surrendered, pre-existing law
must dictate, that is, truly compel
(not just suggest or allow or raise a
question about), the conclusion for
every like-situated, reasonable gov-
ernment agent that what defendant
is doing violates federal law in the
circumstances.”16
The Lassiter formulation of quali-
fied immunity itself became “clearly
established” in the Eleventh Circuit,
although the court did add two clar-
ifications and one corollary. In
Jenkins v. Talladega City Board of
Education17 — an opinion that explic-
itly reaffirmed Lassiter’s “guiding
directives for deciding cases involv-
ing. . . qualified immunity”18 — the
en banc court clarified that the law
could be clearly established only by
decisions from the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Circuit itself, or
the highest court of the state where
the case arose.19 Similarly, in
Hamilton v. Cannon, the court clari-
fied that only the holdings of such
cases, as opposed to dicta contained
in an opinion, could clearly establish
the law for purposes of qualified
immunity.20 Finally, in Smith v.
Mattox, the court noted an important
corollary to the Lassiter rule: a con-
trolling and factually similar case is
not necessary to defeat the qualified
immunity defense if “the official’s
conduct lies so obviously at the very
core of what the [statute or
Constitution] prohibit....... that the
unlawfulness of the conduct was
readily apparent to the official.”21
Such cases, however, represent a
“slender category” of qualified
immunity jurisprudence.22
These rules — the Lassiter test, the
Jenkins and Hamilton clarifications,
and the Smith corollary — were reaf-
firmed in the court’s 2001 en banc
decision in Marsh v. Butler County.23
Thus, roughly twenty years after
Harlow, the Eleventh Circuit had
developed a stable body of qualified
immunity law consisting of the fol-
lowing rules: (1) to defeat a defense
of qualified immunity, preexisting
case law with materially similar facts
generally must compel the conclu-
sion that all reasonable officials in
the defendant’s position would
understand that the conduct in ques-
tion violates federal rights; (2) only
case law from the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the
highest court of the relevant state can
clearly establish the law; (3) only the
holdings of such case law, and not
the dicta contained in judicial opin-
ions, are useful in the qualified
immunity analysis; (4) preexisting
case law is not required in the narrow
category of cases where the official’s
misconduct obviously affects the
very core of the rights at issue; and
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(5) the official’s entitlement to quali-
fied immunity is the usual rule.
THE SUPREME
COURT’S
DECISION IN
HOPE V. PELZER
Almost a year after Marsh, these
rules were called into question by the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Hope v.
Pelzer, which reversed the Eleventh
Circuit’s grant of qualified immunity.
Hope involved an Eighth
Amendment claim brought by an
Alabama inmate alleging that prison
guards restrained him on a hitching
post for seven hours without water
as punishment for disruptive con-
duct.24 A panel of the Eleventh
Circuit decided that the guards’
actions in cuffing the inmate to the
hitching post violated the Eighth
Amendment.25 Nonetheless, because
preexisting case law had not estab-
lished a bright-line rule against such
actions, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the guards were entitled to qualified
immunity.26 Calling the Eighth
Amendment violation “obvious,” the
Supreme Court agreed that the use of
the hitching post violated the
inmate’s constitutional right to be
free from cruel and unusual punish-
ment.27 However, the Court rejected
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding — and
more importantly, its analysis —
with regard to qualified immunity.28
The Court began its qualified
immunity discussion by criticizing
the Eleventh Circuit for requiring
preexisting cases with materially
similar facts to defeat the guards’
qualified immunity defense.
Although acknowledging that the
unlawfulness of the guards’ actions
must have been apparent in light of
preexisting law,29 the Court
nonetheless accused the Eleventh
Circuit of placing a “rigid gloss on
the qualified immunity stan-
dard.”30 What the “clearly estab-
lished” requirement means, accord-
ing to the Court, is that an official is
entitled to “fair warning” that his or
her conduct deprives the victim of a
federal right,31 and “fair warning”
can be given “even in novel factual
circumstances.”32 Thus, the salient
question was not whether the
inmate could point to materially
similar facts, but whether the state
of the law at the time of the hitching
post incident gave the guards “fair
warning” that their actions violated
the inmate’s Eighth Amendment
rights.33 The Court held that it had.
Exactly how the guards received
such warning, however, remains
ambiguous from the Court’s opin-
ion. As noted, in deciding whether
the guards had deprived the inmate
of his constitutional rights, the Court
described the constitutional viola-
tions as “obvious.”34 In addressing
whether the guards had received fair
warning that their conduct was
unlawful, the Court again explained
that their actions constituted “a clear
violation of the Eighth
Amendment.”35 The Court strongly
suggested that, given the clarity and
obviousness of the violation, the gen-
eral principles of law laid down in
the Court’s prior Eighth
Amendment cases were sufficient to
provide fair warning.36 Thus, the
case appeared to fall within the slen-
der category of cases captured by the
Eleventh Circuit’s corollary from
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Smith v. Mattox — i.e., the guards’
misconduct went to the very core of
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment — and the Court simply
could have decided that the Eleventh
Circuit failed to apply its own prece-
dent in this regard. The Court did
not discuss the Smith v. Mattox corol-
lary, however, presumably because
the Eleventh Circuit panel that
decided the case failed to do so.
Accordingly, while the Supreme
Court’s description of the case
seemed to fit the Smith v. Mattox
exception to the requirement for
materially similar prior cases, the
Court never addressed that excep-
tion or even acknowledged that it
existed.37
Instead, the Court proceeded to
explain that — in addition to the fair
warning offered by the general prin-
ciples underlying the Eighth
Amendment — the guards also had
received fair warning from other
sources: (1) binding Eleventh Circuit
precedent holding that several
forms of corporal punishment,
including handcuffing inmates to a
fence, violated the Eighth
Amendment;38 (2) dicta from an
Eleventh Circuit opinion cautioning
against punishing an inmate by
denying water and physically pun-
ishing an inmate who has ceased
resistance to authority;39 (3) an
Alabama Department of Corrections
regulation that actually allowed use
of the hitching post under certain
conditions, which conditions the
Court determined were not fol-
lowed by the guards;40 and (4) a
report by the U.S. Justice
Department, which opined that the
use of the hitching post was uncon-
stitutional.41 The exact weight and
balance of each source in the “fair
warning” analysis is unclear from
the Court’s opinion, but either sepa-
rately or cumulatively, these sources
were found to have provided fair
warning that the guards’ use of the
hitching post violated the inmate’s
Eighth Amendment rights.
Accordingly, the guards were not
entitled to qualified immunity.
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY IN THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AFTER HOPE
Clearly, the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Hope raises serious ques-
tions about the state of qualified
immunity law in the Eleventh
Circuit. The Court sharply criti-
cized the notion that preexisting
case law with materially similar
facts was necessary to defeat quali-
fied immunity. And in focusing on
this prong of the Eleventh Circuit’s
qualified immunity formula, it
failed to acknowledge or apply the
important exception established by
the Smith v. Mattox corollary.
Moreover, in applying its new “fair
warning” test, the Court relied not
only on the holding of a binding
decision, but also to some degree on
judicial dicta, a state regulation, and
an advisory report from a federal
executive branch agency. Finally,
the Court’s rejection of the guards’
qualified immunity defense —
despite the fact that no court had
directly held unconstitutional the
use of the hitching post (and, in
fact, federal district courts in five
other Alabama cases had specifical-
ly rejected the same Eighth
Amendment claim at issue in
Hope42) — rendered uncertain the
proposition that official’s entitle-
ment to qualified immunity is the
usual rule. Thus, in one swoop, the
Supreme Court called into doubt
each of the distinct rules character-
izing the Eleventh Circuit’s hereto-
fore stable body of qualified immu-
nity law. The question, after Hope, is
how this doubt will be resolved.
Fortunately, that question seems
already to have been answered. In
three post-Hope decisions, the
Eleventh Circuit has indicated that
the substance of its qualified immu-
nity law remains largely unchanged
by Hope. In its first meaningful dis-
cussion of qualified immunity after
Hope,43 the Eleventh Circuit under-
took to clarify how “fair warning” is
provided by preexisting law. To
begin with, the court noted that its
prior discussions about the general
necessity for materially similar facts
emphasized, as did Hope, the
requirement that preexisting law
place an official on notice that his
actions are unlawful.44 The court
then explained that such notice was
given by three primary sources.
First, “the words of a federal statute
or federal constitutional provision
may be so clear and the conduct so
bad that case law is not needed to
establish that the conduct cannot be
lawful.”45 Second, under certain cir-
cumstances, case law might set forth
a broad principle with such obvious
clarity that the principle itself will
clearly establish the law for future
cases regardless of any factual varia-
tions.46 Third, in most cases where
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the law is established by judicial
precedents, notice can be given by
preexisting cases with indistinguish-
able facts.47 If the facts of prior
precedents are “fairly distinguish-
able from the circumstances facing a
government official,” however, the
law is not clearly established and
qualified immunity attaches.48 In
addition, the court strongly suggest-
ed that only the holding of prior
precedents, and not dicta contained
in the court’s analysis, can provide
the requisite notice.49 The judicial
dicta cited in Hope, explained the
court, merely strengthened the
notice that already had been provid-
ed by binding precedent.50
The next Eleventh Circuit deci-
sion meaningfully to address Hope
began by stating emphatically that
Hope “did not change the preexist-
ing law of the Eleventh Circuit
much.”51 Taking its lead straight
from Hope’s requirement that pre-
existing law give an official fair
warning, the court explained that
fair warning flowed from “the
applicable law’s being ‘clearly
established’ at the time of the offi-
cial’s alleged unlawful conduct.”52
The court also explained that Hope’s
“fair warning” standard was not
substantively different than the law
as stated by the Eleventh Circuit
prior to Hope, which did not require
the “rigid gloss” perceived by the
Supreme Court. Citing a line of
cases beginning with Smith v.
Mattox, the court noted that it
“ha[d] repeatedly acknowledged
the possibility that a general state-
ment of the law might provide ade-
quate notice of unlawfulness in the
right circumstances.”53
Nonetheless, as recognized in Hope
itself, the unlawfulness must be
apparent, and “[i]n many — if not
most — instances, the apparency of
an unlawful action will be estab-
lished by (if it can be established at
all) preexisting caselaw which is
sufficiently similar in facts to the
facts confronting an officer, such
that we can say every objectively
reasonable officer would have been
on ‘fair notice’ that the behavior
violated a constitutional right.”54
The Eleventh Circuit echoed this
sentiment in the final decision of the
post-Hope triumvirate.55 Again, the
court explained that Hope’s “fair
warning” standard stems from the
requirement that the unlawfulness
of the official’s conduct be apparent
in light of clearly established, preex-
isting law.56 And again, citing Smith
v. Mattox, the court acknowledged
that “factually similar case are not
always necessary to established that
a government actor was on notice
that certain conduct is unlawful.”57
In the narrow category of cases
where an official’s conduct is so
beyond the pale that he or she must
be aware of the unlawfulness of his
actions, no factually similar prior
precedent is needed.58 But, where
the applicable legal standard is char-
acterized by broad generalities and
abstract principles — which is true
of many, if not most legal standards
— “preexisting caselaw that has
applied general law to specific cir-
cumstances will almost always be
necessary to draw a line that is capa-
ble of giving fair and clear notice
than an official’s conduct will violate
federal law.”59 And the court
expressly reaffirmed that, in such
circumstances, only decisions of the
Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Circuit, or the highest court of the
state in which the case arose — in
other words, precedent binding on
the officials accused of the violation
— can provide the requisite notice.60
Putting these three decisions
together yields the conclusion that,
despite the doubts raised by Hope,
the Eleventh Circuit’s qualified
immunity law remains for the most
part unchanged. All three decisions
explain that “fair warning” flows
from the need for clearly established
law rendering the unlawfulness of
an official’s conduct apparent. All
three decisions state that, under nor-
mal circumstances, the law is clearly
established by prior cases with very
similar facts. All three decisions
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acknowledge that factually similar
precedent is not always required,
and all three make clear that the
Eleventh Circuit has never required
factually similar precedent in all
cases. Finally, two of the decisions
reveal that the body and type of
precedent to which courts should
look when analyzing qualified
immunity remains the same as it
was before Hope. Thus, the law of
the Eleventh Circuit after Hope can
be stated as follows: (1) to defeat a
defense of qualified immunity, pre-
existing case law with indistinguish-
ably similar facts generally must
define the law sufficiently to give
every objectively reasonable officer
“fair warning” that the behavior in
question violates a federal right; (2)
only case law from the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the
highest court of the relevant state
can provide the requisite warning;
(3) only the holdings of such case
law, and not the dicta contained in
judicial opinions, are useful in the
qualified immunity analysis; (4) pre-
existing case law is not required in the
narrow category of cases where the
official’s misconduct is so egregious
that he or she must be aware that he
or she is acting illegally; and (5) the
official’s entitlement to qualified
immunity is the usual rule.
CONCLUSION
A comparison of the Eleventh
Circuit’s post-Hope qualified
immunity cases with those ren-
dered by the court prior to Hope
demonstrates that Hope wrought
no substantive change in the law
governing an official’s entitlement
to qualified immunity. In fact, the
rules applied post-Hope are almost
identical to their pre-Hope counter-
parts. Accordingly, as it was before
Hope, the defense of qualified
immunity continues to be the
threshold issue in civil rights cases
against local government officials,
and those officials can still find
comfort that, in most cases, their
entitlement to qualified immunity
will be upheld.
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Of course, the jury would decide
only “the issues of historical fact
that are determinative of the quali-
fied immunity defense,” while the
court (and it only) would deter-
mine as a matter of law whether
those facts entitled the officer to
the defense. See Johnson v.
Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2002); see also Cottrell v.
Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1488 (11th
Cir. 1996). The procedure
employed in Vaughan thus com-
ports with pre-Hope decisions of
the Eleventh Circuit, and while the
denial of qualified immunity
seems anomalous at first blush,
nothing in Vaughan suggests a
sea-change in the Eleventh
Circuit’s qualified immunity
jurisprudence. 
59. Id.
60. Id. at *3.
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